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Abstract 
The research analyzes the impact of the corporate governance based on corporate governance 
award towards the corporate performance of LQ45 firms. The samples were gathered from 
companies that are listed in LQ45 of Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2017 with observation period 
of 2015-2017. Descriptive statistics, correlation and multiple regression analysis were performed 
in this research. The extended analysis includes a control variable of the company size. Prior 
studies indicated that corporate governance aspect based on the corporate governance award 
criteria has a positive and significant influence on the corporate performance.  However, from the 
analysis, the result shows that CGPI award has a negative effect on ROA, this is in contrast with 
other variables such as percentage of independent commissioner and size of board of directors that 
have a positive effect on ROA of companies listed in LQ45 firms.  
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance award, corporate performance 
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1. Introduction 
As the scale and activity of corporations has increased immeasurably, the attention to 
corporate governance (CG) implementation has become more important, corporations need to set 
the framework in order to ensure that their activity is in accordance with the governance. 
According to Clarke & Rama (2006), CG is about how corporations are governed - their ownership 
and control, the objectives they pursue, the rights they respect, the responsibilities they recognize, 
and how they distribute the value they create – that has become a matter of the greatest importance, 
not simply for their directors and shareholders, but for the wider communities they serve. 
Specifically, Sun (n.d) indicated several essential CG principles, i.e. shareholder recognition, 
board responsibility, stakeholder interest, ethical guidelines and transparency.  
Most companies would strive to have a high level of CG as it can affect corporate financial 
performance, as indicated by previous research results (e.g. Heenetigala & Armstrong, 2011; 
Malelak & Basana, 2015; Todorovic, 2013; Javed & Iqbal, 2006). Several measures were used to 
measure corporate financial performance, such as return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA), 
profit margin, earnings per share. Moreover, CG can also affect firm value (Zangina et al., 2009; 
Malelak & Basana, 2015) and lower the cost of debt (e.g. Juniarty & Natalia, 2012; Chen & Jian, 
2007).  
 The emergence of CG in Indonesia is triggered by the financial crisis that occurred in 1998 
as the government expected an improvement of economy and companies’ value in Indonesia. The 
Indonesian government then established Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance (KNKG) in 
1999 to encourage and improve good governance implementation both in public and private 
sectors. The adoption of GCG for companies in Indonesia, just like in other countries, is very 
important to support the stability and sustainable economic growth. Halimatusadiah, Sofianty and 
Ermaya (2015) found that GCG implementation affected corporate profitability, which was 
measured by ROA. In line with this, the mechanism to improve and maximize corporate financial 
performance can be achieved by implementing good governance in the organization (Laksana, 
2015). 
 The improvement of CG implementation in Indonesia has led to the emergence of a 
program called Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) by The Indonesia Institute for 
Corporate Governance (IICG). CGPI is a research program that assesses and ranks GCG 
implementation in companies in Indonesia through research design that encourages companies to 
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improve the quality of the CG application by implementing evaluation and benchmarking. CGPI 
plays a crucial role in bringing companies’ reputation in the society as well as in maintaining 
investors’ confidence. A higher CGPI rating means better transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independency and fairness. Since investors are likely to consider this rating when 
making their investment decisions, it is expected that the higher the rating is, the more positive 
impact it will bring to the company’s performance. However, a previous study shows that CG 
implementation rating was not directly responded by the Indonesian stock market and has not been 
able to increase the company’s growth in the short term (Wahyudin & Solikhah, 2012). Therefore, 
in this research, the authors try to investigate the effect of CG towards a company’s performance.  
 Using a sample of 45 companies listed in LQ45 index during 2015-2017, the authors found 
that CGPI negatively affects companies’ performance, which was measured by ROA. Other CG 
measures used in this research, i.e. independent commissioners and board of director size, 
positively affect ROA, although only board or director size was found to be significant. The 
implications of this unexpected relationship sign between CGPI and companies’ performance may 
serve as a trigger to evaluate the effectiveness of CGPI program in measuring CG practices as well 
as investors’ awareness of its existence of such program. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
underpinning CG, section 3 provides explanations regarding the research method, section 4 
presents research result and discussion, while section 5 concludes this research.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Corporate Governance Definition 
CG is defined as the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. As a 
concept, GCG does not have a single definition. The Cadbury Committee (1992) defines GCG as 
a principle that directs and controls the company to achieve a balance between the strength and 
authority of the company in providing accountability to its particular shareholders and stakeholders 
in general. OECD (2004) states that CG is part of a larger economic context in which firms operate, 
and focuses on the decision-making process of a company that should be based on principles of 
GCG, such as transparency, responsibility, accountability and fairness. A GCG system ensures 
that the corporation sets appropriate objectives and puts systems and structures in place to ensure 
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that these objectives are met, it is considered as a tool for all shareholders to control and monitor 
the activities of the corporation (Khan, 2011). 
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) defines GCG as a set of rules that 
regulate the relationship between shareholders, managers of companies, creditors, governments, 
employees and other internal and external stakeholders related to their rights and obligations, or in 
other words, it is a system that regulates and controls the company (FCGI, 2001). Whereas, The 
Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG) (2009) defines CG as a process and structure 
that is set in order to operate a company with the main goal to increase shareholders value in the 
long term while still considering the interests of other stakeholders in accordance with laws and 
regulations and applicable norms. 
From several CG definitions above, it can be deduced that CG is a framework by which 
organizations are directed and controlled; it is about the relationships and distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
 
2.2 Relevant Theories 
According to Abdullah & Valentine (2009), there are several theories that can explain CG 
and a combination of various theories is best to describe an effective GCG practice rather than 
theorizing corporate governance based on a single theory. This research will emphasize on three 
theories that could address the issues underlying CG and corporate performance: Agency Theory, 
Stewardship Theory, and Stakeholders Theory. 
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 Agency theory describes the relationship between the principals (shareholders) and agents 
(the company’s executives and managers). The principal is the party who gives the authorization 
to the agent to act on behalf of the principal, while the agent is the party who is given the 
authorization by the principal to run the company. The agents are obliged to account for what has 
been mandated by the principal to them, however, management as an agent is often considered to 
act for its own interests, or not as a wise and fair party to the shareholders (principals). The 
separation of ownership and differences in interests between principals and agents creates agency 
problems or conflicts of interest. As the party that manages the company, the agent has more 
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information. On the other hand, principals do not have enough information about the agent's 
performance. This results in inequality of information between principals and agents called 
asymmetric information. This can lead to two problems (Rankin et al. , 2012): (1) moral hazard – 
a problem that occurs if the agent does not carry out what has been agreed in the work contract 
and (2) adverse selection – a problem that occurs if the principal does not know whether the 
decision taken by the agent is based on information that has been obtained or agents are being 
negligence in their task. In agency theory, shareholders expect the agents to act and make decisions 
in the principal’s best interest. Conversely, the agent may not necessarily make decisions in the 
best interests of the principals (Padilla, 2000).  
 Agency theory is believed as a theory that can explain corporate governance, in the issue 
of asymmetric information or inequality information between principals and agents, GCG plays a 
crucial role to reduce agency problem. The existence of CG leads a company to set the framework 
in order to ensure that their activity is in accordance with the governance, which can minimize 
principal’s misperceptions regarding company’s information as it has been set in the legal 
framework. Rankin et al.  (2012)  found CG as a mechanism where a board of director is an 
essential monitoring device to minimize as well as decrease the problems brought about by the 
principal-agent relationship. Hence a monitoring mechanism is required to protect shareholder 
interests (Rankin et al. , 2012). By this sense, it can be suggested that CG has a positive impact in 
terms of reducing agency problem as well as giving benefits to financial performance since it can 
provide assurance to investors which leads to increase in investment. 
 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
 Stewardship theory assumes that managers are loyal to the company and interested in 
achieving high performance. In particular, managers are seen as those who are motivated by the 
need to achieve intrinsic satisfaction through success in carrying out challenging work, as well as 
to carry out their responsibility and authority to gain recognition from their leaders and other 
parties for their success. This theory also argues that an organization needs a structure that allows 
harmonization to be achieved from an effective relationship between manager and owner. . Rankin 
et al.  (2012), stated that stewardship theory emphasized more on the role of top management as 
stewards with the integrated objectives as part of the organization, is the underlined concern of 
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stewardship theory as the stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are satisfied and 
motivated when organizational success is achieved. 
 Moreover, Daily, et al. (2003), claimed that in order to protect the executives and directors’ 
reputation as decision makers in organizations, they are disposed to operate the firm themselves to 
maximize financial performance as well as to increase shareholders’ profits. By this sense, it is 
believed that the firm’s performance can directly impact the perceptions of their individual 
performance. It is proven as  Rankin et al.  (2012) argued that executives and directors are also 
managing their careers so that they can be seen as effective stewards. Additionally, stewardship 
theory suggests merging the role of the CEO and the chairman in order to reduce agency costs and 
to have greater role as stewards in the organization, the result shows that there would be better 
safeguarding of the interest of the shareholders. 
 Overall, stewardship theory is also believed as one of the theories that can explain CG as a 
steward is defined as someone who protects the needs of others, which means a steward will protect 
the interest of the owners or shareholders and will make decision on their best interest. This fact 
leads to a statement that both objectives of CG and stewardship theory are considered to be aligned. 
However, it was empirically found that the outcomes have improved by having both agency theory 
and stewardship theory combined rather than separated  
 
2.2.3 Stakeholders Theory 
 Stakeholders theory suggests that managers in organizations have a network of 
relationships to serve, not only shareholders, but also the suppliers, employees and business 
partners. Stakeholders theory states that the purpose of a business is to create value for various 
stakeholder groups, not just shareholders (Gibson, 1999). In cases where there is a conflict of 
interest between the shareholders and other stakeholders, the interests of the shareholders must be 
moderated or sacrificed to fulfill the basic obligations of the other stakeholders. Due to the 
extraordinary status and the control possessed by the shareholders as stated in company law, 
Stakeholders theory tends to devote less attention to defend the rights of shareholders. It is believed 
that Stakeholders theory can also explain CG as it explains how the company should be controlled 
in order to create value to everyone who have a stake in the company.  
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2.3 Impact of Good Corporate Governance  
The benefits obtained in implementing GCG are varied, such as improving organizational 
performance through the creation of better decision-making processes, improving the operational 
efficiency of the organization, improving services to stakeholders, and simplify to obtain cheaper 
and non-rigid financing funds (due to trust issues) which will ultimately increase the value of the 
organization (corporate value), as well as to increase investors’ trust and confidence to lend their 
money. GCG implementation is believed to lead to the good performance of the company, as it 
can be seen in the growth of the size of the company itself, whether it is reflected from its higher 
investment level or the increasing in sales (Mallin, 2004). It has been argued that CG has a 
significant impact in the performance of the company as it is an important factor in maintaining 
stakeholders’ trust and confidence. In terms of the investor’s confidence, Alnaser, Shaban, & Zubi 
(2014), found that investors’ confidence emerges because of effective CG practices. Alnaser, 
Shaban & Zubi (2014), recommended that in order to maintain the current level of investors' 
confidence, company should keep its current governance practices under continuous evaluation 
and assessment process. 
 Malelak and Basana (2015) found four CG variables (board of director, independent 
commissioner, institutional ownership, and public ownership) that had significant impact on firm 
performance (proxied by return on equity). Nevertheless, gap phenomenon also exists in this case 
because there were direction inconsistencies of the relationship among the variables. In another 
research, Heenetigala & Armstrong (2011) found a positive relationship between CG practices 
(separate leadership, board composition, board committee) with the firm performance (measured 
by return on equity and return on asset). However, Zangina et al., (2009), found that board size, 
leverage and income volatility are the significant determinants in terms of the firm value, while 
inside ownership has no significant effect on firm value especially in terms of share price. 
Todorovic (2013) found that listed companies on Banja Stock Exchange Wounds that have high 
CG values will have a higher net profit margin and earnings per share. Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) 
conducted a study of the relationship between CG and financial performance in companies listed 
in the Enterprise Performance for Open Joint-Stock Companies (OJSC) in Ukraine. The result of 
this study indicated that there was a positive relationship between CG and financial performance.  
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Moreover, Javed and Iqbal (2006) conducted a research on the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance on companies listed on the Karachi Stock Market 
in Pakistan. The result of this study showed that board composition, ownership and shareholding 
had a positive relationship with financial performance, while transparency and disclosure had no 
significant influence on financial performance. Another aspect of the measurement of firm 
performance is the cost of debt. According to Juniarty and Natalia (2012), GCG is also considered 
as a tool to lowering the cost of debt in companies. In this case, the role of GCG principles to the 
cost of debt have been investigated by Chen and Jian (2007), who concluded that transparency in 
providing information will diminish default risk and finally reduce cost of debt.  
  
2.4 Corporate Governance in Asia 
Li & Nair (2009) argued that CG has turned into an important concern for Chinese and 
Indian firms as they progressively interact with regulators and investors from developed markets 
as well as to respond to corporate scandals that have been occurred recently, therefore the urge to 
encourage GCG implementation is necessary for both emerging countries. There are contradictory 
perspectives regarding whether Asia needs exclusive Asian CG theories or not. Qian (2002) 
arranged a framework to evaluate this issue. He claimed that a well-established discipline should 
have three dimensions, such as perspective, reference, and analytical tools. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to create country-specific economics, yet the implementation of existing theories could 
improve uniqueness and country-specific insights (Qian, 2002).  
 Bauer et al (2008) conducted a research in Japan with six provisions governance provided 
by the International Governance Metrics (GMI). The result showed that those related to financial 
disclosure, internal control, shareholder rights, and remuneration had a significant influence 
towards stock price performance. Provisions related to the board accountability, market for control, 
and corporate behavior did not affect stock price performance.  
 
2.5 Corporate Governance in Indonesia and the CGPI 
In Indonesia, most companies have not fully implemented GCG due to the General 
Guidelines of GCG in Indonesia that is voluntary, and no legal sanctions if the company does not 
implement the guidelines. The government should stipulate regulations and create conducive 
situations for GCG enforcement through a regulatory approach on GCG to encourage public 
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companies to participate in the CGPI ranking programs, as currently it is still a voluntary program, 
this strategy is also aim to improve companies’ commitments on GCG implementation. It also 
expected that companies can implement GCG not only to comply with regulations but also to 
increase their performance and make GCG implementation as part of the corporate culture 
(Wahyudin & Solikhah, 2012).  
In order to assess GCG implementation in a company, The Indonesia Institute for 
Corporate Governance (IICG) has a program called Corporate Governance Perception Index 
(CGPI) which has been operating since 2001 until now. CGPI is a research program that assesses 
and ranks GCG implementation in companies in Indonesia through research design that 
encourages companies to improve the quality of the corporate governance application by 
implementing evaluation and benchmarking. CGPI is attended by public listed companies 
(issuers), state-owned enterprises, banks, and other private corporates. 
CGPI can be regarded as one of CG indicators in Indonesia. In general, new companies or 
start-up companies are willing to take part and participate in CGPI survey if their financial 
performances are relatively stable and not experiencing problems that are material in their financial 
statements. Companies that are listed in the CGPI ranking score have been proven to have 
implemented a GCG which directly increase their value of the market shares. CG award also has 
a huge impact for the company, not only to get the good reputation in society, but also to increase 
and maintain investor’s confidence to invest in their company. Specifically, there are several 
benefits of CGPI. Firstly, to arrange a company that is not yet in line and has not supported the 
realization of GCG. Secondly, to increase awareness and share commitment from internal 
companies and stakeholders on the implementation of GCG. Thirdly, to specify the mapping of 
strategic problems in GCG practices. Lastly, to act as alternative improvements to quality 
indicators or quality standards. However, research shows that CG implementation rating is not 
directly responded by the Indonesian stock market and has not yet been able to increase the 
company’s growth in the short term. 
The CG rating in Indonesia is assessed through four stages; it also uses the CG index as a 
measurement, such as compliance, conformance and performance, associated with a variety of 
accounting-based and market-based performance variables, such as financial performance, market 
value and growth. The first stage is self-assessment, which is an independent assessment by all 
elements, members and stakeholders of the company regarding the quality of GCG implementation 
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in the company. At this stage, the company answers a questionnaire by inviting respondents to 
give their honest and objective perceptions to provide feedback and evaluation to the company. 
The second stage is the document assessment, whereby companies submit various documents 
regarding the implementation of GCG and other documents related to the valuation matters. Next 
stage is the compilation of papers, which explains GCG implementation processes and programs 
in the company as well as management efforts related to the assessment matters. The paper 
describes the direction and focus of the assessment in accordance with the systematic guidelines 
of writing that have been set. The final assessment stage is observation, which takes form of a 
‘direct review’ by the CGPI assessment team to ensure that the process of implementing a GCG 
implementation programs and management efforts is correlated to the assessment theme. 
Regarding the results of CGPI assessment, the results of the CGPI program ranking will 
use the assessment norms based on the range of scores achieved by CGPI participants with 
categorization of the level of quality of GCG implementation using the term "trusted". Hence, 
companies that get a score between 55.00% and 69.99% will get the title of a "fairly trusted" 
company. Companies that get scores between 70.00% and 84.99% will get the title of "trusted" 
company. And companies that get scores between 85.00% and 100% will get the award of "highly 
trusted" company.  
 
2.6 Hypothesis Development  
Epps and Cereola’s (2008) study on the relations of CG rating on the company's 
performance in 2002-2004 compared the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) CG quotient 
(CGQ) rating with two measurements of the company's operational performance, namely ROA 
and ROE. The result showed that no statistical evidence was found if the ISS CG rating affects 
company performance. Research from Klapper and Love (2003) shows that GCG is highly 
correlated with asymmetric information and contracting imperfections that are represented by the 
composition of assets, growth opportunities, and company size. Companies with high level of 
GCG are commonly found in countries with weak legal systems. GCG is positively correlated with 
the company's operational performance as measured by ROA and market valuation as measured 
using Tobin’s Q. In the Indonesian context, using a sample of companies that were listed in the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2001 and 2002 and were included in the ranking list of GCG 
implementation conducted by the IICG, Darmawati et al. (2005) discovered that there was no 
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significant relationship between CG index and Tobin's q but there was a significant positive 
relationship between CG index and return on equity.  
 Most prior research can be related to agency theory, where the separation of ownership and 
differences in interests between principals and agents will create agency problems or conflicts of 
interest. From the concept above, the shareholder is recognized as the principal, and the company 
is recognized as the agent. As the party that manages the company, the agent has more information 
about the company's capacity, company’s performance, work environment and the company as a 
whole. On the other hand, principals (shareholders) do not have enough information about the 
agent's performance. This results in inequality of information between principals and agents called 
asymmetric information. CG mechanisms is expected to minimize the agency problems arising 
from agency relationship. By implementing GCG, it is believed that it will lead to the good 
performance of the company. 
In addition, CGPI is expected to play an essential role. A company with a higher CGPI rating is 
perceived as managed with transparency, accountability, responsibility, independency and 
fairness. Therefore, by achieving the award and acquire a predicate of a highly trusted company, 
it is assumed that the company will get a higher competitive edge as there will be an impact on the 
outputs of corporate performance implementation, contemplating that investors and creditors are 
expected to consider the CGPI rating for their investment decisions. Thus, from the theories and 
explanation above, the authors develop the following hypothesis: GCG implementation based on 
CG award positively affects the company’s financial performance.  
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sampling Design 
This research uses in non-probability purposive sampling technique. The sample 
companies are those listed in LQ45 of Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) that are classified as the 
CG awardee and the non-awardee. The authors determine the sample from the list of companies 
included in the LQ45 in 2017, and a three-year observation period is taken from 2015-2017. LQ45 
companies are chosen because they are big firms and followed frequently by analysts. Therefore, 
they are most likely to disclose CG report. The chosen companies must have to fulfill the criteria 
of: (1) listed in LQ45 index and (2) have full annual report during 2015-2017. 
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3.2 Data Collection Method 
 The data collection method will be a secondary data that is gathered from annual reports 
of each company. This data collection will be focusing on the board characteristics, specifically 
on independent commissioner and board size, and financial performances. This research will 
analyze the relationship between board characteristics of the companies and their financial 
performance, specifically in terms of ROA. The data of board characteristics and financial 
performances will be taken from annual reports in corporate governance section. Other than that, 
this research will also collect other additional data, which is the log normal of companies’ total 
assets as the proxy for company size. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis Method 
3.3.1 Research Variables  
 The dependent variable of this research is the company performance, which will be 
measured by ROA. ROA is chosen as it is believed to be affected by the CG implementation. The 
independent variable of this research is the CG, which will be measured by percentage of 
independent commissioner, board size, and CGPI award (a dummy variable). The authors also 
include a control variable, which is the company size, that will be measured by log normal of 
companies’ total assets. The purpose of controlling this variable is because it also has a relationship 
with the dependent variable, however, this variable is not the main focus of the research.  
 
3.3.2 Research Model 
 This research will use the regression analysis in order to examine the relationship between 
LQ45 company’s CG and corporate performance. The regression equation is as follows:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = company performance of firm i in year t which is measured by ROA 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by the percentage of independent 
commissioners compared to the total number of commissioners 
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𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by board size of the total number of 
board of directors in the company 
𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡  = CGPI award of firm i in year t (dummy variable of 1 for awardee or 0 for non-
awardee companies) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = company size of firm i in year t which is measured by normal log of total assets 
 
The operating hypotheses for the data analysis are as follows: 
H0: β1 = 0 
Ha: β1 > 0 
Where the null hypothesis represents that if β1 is equal to zero, CG will no impact on the company 
performance. In contrast, the alternative hypothesis indicates that if β1 is greater than 0, CG would 
positively affect the company performance, which is the desired outcomes. 
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis Method 
 This research collects data from the sample companies’ annual report. There will be 3 
statistical analysis that the authors will conduct in order to obtain the result of the relationship 
between dependent variable and independent variables. First is descriptive statistics, which will 
describe the basic features of data, i.e. maximum, minimum, mean, and standard deviation values 
of each variables, to find out more about the data used in this study. Second is the correlation 
analysis that aims to measure the relationship between variables, especially between the dependent 
and independent variables. Third is the regression coefficient analysis to analyze the importance 
of each independent variable (T-test) and also the significance of the research model through 
simultaneous influence of independent variables on the dependent variable (F-test). This 
regression analysis will also determine whether the hypothesis is accepted or rejected. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics of the collected data: 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = company performance of firm i in year t which is measured by ROA 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by the percentage of independent 
commissioners compared to the total number of commissioners 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by board size of the total number of 
board of directors in the company 
𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡  = CGPI award of firm i in year t (dummy variable of 1 for awardee or 0 for non-
awardee companies) 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = company size of firm i in year t which is measured by normal log of total assets 
 
Table 1 above shows that the CGPI variable has the lowest value of 0 which is a dummy 
of a non-award company and has a maximum value of 1 which is a dummy of a company that gets 
the award; the median value is 0 and standard deviation 0.412. The board size variable has the 
lowest value of 4 and the highest value of 12 with an average of 7.319, median of 7 and 2.101 data 
distribution. The independent commissioner variable has a minimum value of 25 and the highest 
value of 80 with an average of 42.681 and the distribution of data 12.831. Meanwhile, the ROA 
variable has the lowest value of -22.910 and the highest value of 45.790 with an average of 7.728, 
median of 5.510 and 9.206 data distribution. 
From a total of 135 firm-year values, there were 25 firm-year values (approximately 
18.5%) that received CGPI awards in the 2015-2017 period. There were 7 companies that 
consistently got the awards during 2015-2017. Table 2 below shows ROA comparison between 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
 
Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 135 -22.910 45.790 7.728 5.510 9.206 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 135 25 80 42.681 .400 12.831 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 135 4 12 7.319 7 2.101 
𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 135 0 1 .210 .000 .412 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 135 3.480 6.050 4.528 4.423 .586 
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awardees and non-awardees, which interestingly result in a higher ROA for those non-awardee 
companies. 
 
Table 2 ROA Comparison between Awardees and Non-Awardees Firms 
Type N ROA Mean 
Awardee 25 4.449 
Non-awardee 110 8.474 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is a statistical method used to determine the strength or degree of linear 
relations between two or more variables. The more actual the linear relationship (straight-line), the 
stronger or higher the degree of straight-line relationship between the two variables or more. At 
this stage, the authors try to find the relationship between independent and control variables to the 
dependent variable.  
 
Table 3 Correlations Matrix 
Variables 𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 1 .412
** .186* .570** -.181* 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 .412
** 1 .276** .559** -.021 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 .186
* .276** 1 .247** .050 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 .570
** .559** .247** 1 -.302** 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 -.181
* -.021 .050 -.302** 1 
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𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡  = CGPI award of firm i in year t (dummy variable of 1 for awardee or 0 for non-awardee 
companies) 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by board size of the total number of board of 
directors in the company 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by the percentage of independent 
commissioners compared to the total number of commissioners 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = company size of firm i in year t which is measured by normal log of total assets 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = company performance of firm i in year t which is measured by ROA 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
In the table above, the test is conducted using Pearson, it is to measure the correlation 
between the variables in this study. From the table above, we can find out that board  of director 
size has a negative relationship with r = -0.021, independent commissioners has a positive 
relationship with r = 0.050, CGPI has a negative relationship with r = -0.18, the control variable 
of company’s size has a negative relationship with r = -0.302, in relation to the dependent variable 
(ROA). 
 
4.3 Regression Results 
 A regression analysis is performed based on the research model specified in section 3.3.2. 
The result is provided in the following table: 
Table 4 Regression Analysis Results 
Variable CP t-stat Sig 
Constant 27.664** (3.955) .000 
𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 -1.058 (-0.472) .638 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 0.874* (1.979) .050 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 0.076 (1.234) .219 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 -6.478** (-3.724) .000 
Adj R-square 
0.107 
 
F-value   0.001 
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𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡  = CGPI award of firm i in year t (dummy variable of 1 for awardee or 0 for non-awardee 
companies) 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by board size of the total number of board of 
directors in the company 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = CG of firm i in year t which is measured by the percentage of independent 
commissioners compared to the total number of commissioners 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  = company size of firm i in year t which is measured by normal log of total assets 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Based on the regression results presented in table 4, the regression equation is presented as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  27.664 +  0.076𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  0.874𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 1.058𝐶𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 6.478𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
The equation shows that the independent commissioner variable has a positive relationship 
with ROA, but it is insignificant. Whereas for the board size, this variable has a positive significant 
relationship with ROA. However, counterintuitively, the CGPI variable has a negative relationship 
with and does not significantly influence the ROA variable. The control variable of company size 
has a negative and significant influence on ROA. The F-value result indicates that the independent 
variables affect the dependent variable simultaneously (together). The table also shows that the 
adjusted R Square value is 0.107 or 10.7%, which means that 10.7% of the variations in dependent 
variable can be explained by the independent variables included in this study.  
 Overall, the findings of current study support the result of prior studies which were 
mentioned in the introduction and literature review section, specifically with Heenetigala and 
Armstrong (2011), Zangina et al., (2009), Javed and Iqbal (2006), Halimatusadiah, Sofianty and 
Ermaya (2015), Malelak and Basana (2015), Todorovic (2013), Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006), and 
Darmawati et al. (2005),  who found that CG practices positively influence firm performance. The 
insignificant negative relationship between CGPI variable and the company’s performance which 
is measured by ROA is somewhat similar to what Wahyudin and Solikhah (2012) found, whereby 
CG rating was not directly responded by the Indonesian stock market and has not been able to 
increase the company’s growth in the short term. This result also supports Epps and Cereola’s 
(2008) study, who did not find statistical evidence about CG rating’s effect on company’s 
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performance. This finding is also contrary to Alnaser, Shaban and Zubi’s (2014) recommendation 
that companies should keep its current governance practices under continuous evaluation and 
assessment process, which can be associated with CGPI variable, to increase investors’ confidence 
towards the company.  
 This interesting finding may be attributable to the possibility that investors and 
stakeholders in general do not consider CGPI rating when evaluating a company. Another 
plausible explanation could be that stakeholders are lacking awareness of the existence of CGPI 
rating and the company’s achievement in the CGPI rating. In addition, CGPI rating may not be 
perceived as a factor that can represent a company’s CG practices. Overall, the result of current 
study appears to support agency theory, in which CG mechanisms are designed to reduce agency 
problems and information asymmetry prevalent in agency relationship, hence can lead to 
improvement of the company’s performance. However, despite the existence of CG mechanisms 
that are put in place, principals may not be fully informed about the company, one of which could 
be the CGPI rating. 
 
5. Conclusion, Limitations, Implication and Recommendation  
This research focuses on the relationship between CGPI award and CG factors to 
company’s financial performance listed in LQ45 Index. Financial performance is measured by the 
company’s ROA ratio, CGPI is measured using dummy variable and CG factors are measured by 
percentage of independent commissioner and the size of board of director. This research includes 
company’s size as the control variable. The research result shows that CGPI award has a negative 
and insignificant influence on ROA, independent commissioners has a positive and insignificant 
effect on ROA, board of director size has a significant positive effect on ROA. Overall, the result 
of this research matches with previous research that suggest a positive relationship between CG 
and financial performance. However, an interesting finding should be noted regarding the negative 
and insignificant relationship of CGPI and ROA, which may warrant further research.  
 There are at least two research limitations that can be identified from this study. First, the 
research sample was gathered from 45 companies listed in LQ45 Index, which come from various 
industrial sectors. This factor could affect the research result as each sector has its own 
characteristics. Second, the time horizon used in this study only covers a three-year period from 
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2015-2017, which may affect the research result. For further study, it is recommended to use a 
longer time period and to take sample from companies with similar industrial sector. 
This research can benefit several parties, such as publicly listed firms, investors, 
academician, bankers and students, other researches, and regulators. Specifically, the research 
result could be regarded as an input for the IICG to evaluate its CGPI program so that it can better 
serve its intended function as one of the CG measures in a company.  
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